Reply by Stuntz, William J.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 93 Issue 5 
1995 
Reply 
William J. Stuntz 
University of Virginia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Law Enforcement and 
Corrections Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William J. Stuntz, Reply, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1102 (1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol93/iss5/6 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
REPLY 
William J. Stuntz* 
It is common ground in Fourth Amendment law and literature 
that the law should protect privacy, that its primary purpose should 
be to regulate what police officers can see and ·hear. I believe this 
view is mistaken, for reasons that emerge nicely when one thinks 
about how the privacy norm would affect the law outside criminal 
procedure. If we took seriously the things courts say in Fourth 
Amendment cases and tried to apply them to everything the gov-
ernment does (instead of applying them only to the police), we 
would soon find ourselves in the constitutional world of 1905. If 
there is something wrong with the constitutional order of the Loch-
ner era, there must be something wrong with focusing the law of 
police investigation on privacy. It would be better if the law were 
to emphasize the one thing that most distinguishes the police from 
other government officials: the police use force, sometimes violent 
force, on individual citizens. 
I think Professor Seidman agrees with all this.1 We disagree 
mainly about how far the law has already traveled along the path 
from guarding privacy to regulating coercion. Even there, our disa-
greement is only partial: both of us note that the Fifth Amendment 
has largely made this shift,2 and both of us note that the Fourth 
Amendment tends not to apply except in situations in which there 
is a coercive confrontation between a police officer and a suspect.3 
Perhaps, as Seidman suggests, these patterns show that the law does 
not really worry about privacy anymore. But I doubt it. The key 
point here is what Fourth Amendment law does in cases in which it 
applies. The Fourth Amendment regulates street stops, but it pays 
little attention to how coercively the police behave in those stops -
instead, the law concerns itself with whether and when the police 
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia.-Ed. 
1. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy's Problem, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1079, 1081, 1087-92 (1995). 
2. Id. at 1082-84; William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Proce-
dure, 93 MICH. L. RBv. 1016, 1068-71. (1995). 
3. See Seidman, supra note 1, at 1090-92; Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1056-57, 1071 & n.200. 
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can look in suspects' pockets.4 So too, the law limits police officers' 
ability to enter people's houses but turns a blind eye to how vio-
lently the cops behave once inside.5 I try to demonstrate these 
points in my article, and I won't rehash the examples here. Suffice 
it to say that the law gives the police a lot more incentive to worry 
about where they look than about how roughly they treat the 
targets of their attention. Searches are a bigger deal in Fourth 
Amendment law than seizures, even seizures ·of people. This is a 
consequence of courts thinking primarily about privacy, about peo-
ple's ability to keep secrets, instead of about what makes the police 
a potential danger in a free society - the fact that they have guns 
and clubs and can use them. 
The second half of Seidman's essay raises a different and 
broader point. Seidman contends that the very idea of protecting a 
private sphere cannot survive legal realism, for one cannot tell what 
is "private" without some baseline, and the realists showed that no 
baseline is more natural than any other. Once government power 
extends potentially to everything, the government can extort "con-
sent" to anything. When the greater power is all-encompassing, 
and when the greater power usually includes the lesser, there is no 
stopping the exercise of lesser powers.6 
Seidman may be right about all this. (Though there are ways of 
limiting lesser powers. As Seth Kreimer has shown, the law can 
adopt baselines other than potential government authority - for 
example, one might ask whether, if the lesser power were denied, 
the government really might exercise the greater power.7 This 
amounts to asking whether the government is using its power as a 
bluff. The question is quite similar to what the law asks in contract 
duress cases, or in blackmail cases.) And if Seidman is right, I agree 
that his point devastates any theory of constitutional privacy 
protection. 
But the baselines problem cannot devastate all constitutional 
regulation of the police. Even in a world in which the public-pri-
4. Thus, as I note in the article, the law requires a greater justification for ordering a 
suspect to empty his jacket pockets than for seizing him at gunpoint See Stuntz, supra note 
2, at 1065-66. 
5. See id. at 1066-68. 
6. See Seidman, supra note 1, at 1094-1099. 
7. See Seth F. Kreimer, A/locational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Posi-
tive State, 132 U. PA. L REv. 1293, 1371-74 (1984). For an application of this part of 
Kreimer's argument to some Fourth Amendment problems, see Wtlliam J. Stuntz, Implicit 
Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth ~mendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553, 567-76 
(1992). 
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vate distinction has collapsed, the government is not free to shoot 
its citizens or to club them on the street. Violence is not the gov-
ernment's right but something to be used sparingly, and only for the 
right sorts of reasons. Regulating violence casts no doubt on the 
constitutionality of the regulatory state, becaus~ the regulatory 
state tends to exercise its power in less than violent ways. Thus, 
focusing the law of police investigation on coercion and violence 
does not raise the same kinds of difficulties as protecting the sanc-
tity of briefcases and glove compartments. In particular, it does not 
fall prey to the kinds of realist attacks that Sejdman raises in his 
interesting essay. We are left with the proposition that using the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to protect privacy cannot work, but 
using them to limit coercion and violence can. In other words, the 
sensible course of action - worrying about what the police can do 
to people rather than what they can see - is also the only course of 
action that doesn't collide with the rest of our constitutional order. 
